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Policy Brief
The ECB has announced a 750-billion-euro purchase programme to fight 
the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. But like all ECB program-
mes in recent years, the new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme 
(PEPP) will likely be challenged in court. This policy brief assesses whether 
the PEPP will likely survive a legal challenge. It argues that the PEPP is com-
patible with EU law because it meets the three criteria the Court of Justice 
of the EU has established to check the legality of monetary policy measu-
res: First, the PEPP falls within the ECB’s mandate. Second, it respects the 
principle of proportionality. And third, it does not violate the prohibition of 
monetary financing. This assessment even holds if the ECB were to relax 
some of the constraints in the PEPP like the issuer limit currently applicable 
to other bond-buying programmes.
Introduction
On 18 March 2020, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced a 750 
billion euro bond purchase programme called Pandemic Emergency Pur-
chase Programme (PEPP) to address the economic and financial fallout 
from COVID-19.1 Under the PEPP, the ECB and national central banks 
(NCBs) will buy mostly government bonds until the end of 2020, or 
longer if necessary, and the programme closely follows the rules under 
which the current Public Sector Purchase Programme (aka: Quantitative 
Easing or QE) operates. The purchases will eventually follow the capital 
key of the NCBs by the time the programme comes to an end but will 
be flexible over time and space. As a result, the PEPP allows the ECB 
and NCBs to buy government bonds wherever and whenever necessa-
ry to ensure that interest rate spreads between the bonds of different 
member states do not undermine the functioning of monetary policy 
in the Eurozone. Crucially, the ECB also announced that it would review 
1 European Central Bank (ECB), ECB announces €750 billion Pandemic Emergency 
Purchase Programme (PEPP), 18 March 2020, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/
date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html.
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the limits it has set itself for the PSPP if they undermine PEPP effectiveness. These limits 
include inter alia the rule that the ECB can only buy up to 33% of a country’s outstanding 
debt (issuer limit) and the same share of any individual bond (issue limit).
Every time the ECB adopted a programme to purchase government bonds in the past, 
this led to legal challenges that ultimately had to be resolved by the Court of Justice of 
the EU (CJEU) in Luxembourg. This will be similar for the PEPP – with one huge difference: 
We have two landmark cases by the CJEU against which we can assess the PEPP’s lega-
lity: In Gauweiler, the CJEU confirmed that the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
programme did not violate the Treaty due to the conditions set by the ECB; in Weiss, the 
Court stated the limits under which the ECB can buy government bonds of all member 
states under the PSPP. This brief explains why an assessment based on these two jud-
gments should lead us to the conclusion that the PEPP is legal and well within the ECB’s 
mandate. First, it reviews the main legal considerations that the Court has applied when 
judging ECB actions, namely the adherence to the mandate, the respect for the principle 
of proportionality and the respect for the monetary financing prohibition, examining 
how PEPP meets these two criteria. It then, second, argues why even an increase in the 
issuer and issue limits would be legal.
Criteria for assessing the PEPP‘s legality 
Like any other ECB bond purchase programme, the PEPP needs to comply with the per-
tinent provisions in the EU Treaties and their interpretation by the Court. The CJEU has 
jurisdiction over challenges to the ECB’s monetary policy decisions. And, while the ECB’s 
bond purchase programmes have also been challenged before the German Federal Cons-
titutional Court, it is important to keep in mind that the CJEU has sole powers when it 
comes to interpreting legal acts by EU institutions based on EU law. This is why, for the 
first time since Germany joined the European Community, two referrals were made on 
these issues to the CJEU by the German Federal Constitutional Court.
The CJEU has reviewed all monetary policy measures that involved the purchase of sove-
reign debt securities, i.e. the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)2, the Securities Mar-
kets Programme (SMP)3, and the PSPP4, and confirmed their legality under EU law. Both 
the Gauweiler case (concerning the OMT) as well as the Weiss case (concerning the PSPP) 
focused on compliance with Articles 119, 123(1), 127(1) and (2) of the Treaty of the Func-
tioning of the EU (TFEU) and Articles 17 to 24 of the Protocol on the ESCB (European 
System of Central Banks) and the ECB. 
On the basis of these provisions of primary EU law, the Court essentially established 
three criteria for a given ECB bond purchase programme to be permissible:
 (i) compliant with the ECB’s mandate (2.a), 
 (ii) proportionate to the objectives (2.b), and
 (iii) compatible with the prohibition of monetary financing (2.c).
2 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. ECB, 16 June 2015.
3 Case T-79/13, Accorinti and Others v. ECB, 7 October 2015. This case differs from the two other challenges 
against the ECB bond purchase programmes, since it concerns the legality of the carve-out of ECB bond 
holdings during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012. However, the General Court at least obiter concluded 
that the ECB had the legal authority to purchase bonds.
4 Case C-493/17, Weiss and Others v. ECB, 11 December 2018.
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The PEPP meets all these criteria:
 a. The PEPP is compliant with the ECB’s mandate
According to the Treaties5, the Eurosystem, composed of the ECB and the NCBs of euro 
area Member States, has the exclusive competence to conduct the monetary policy of 
the Union, as defined in Article 127 TFEU. When assessing a bond purchase programme’s 
compliance with the ECB’s mandate, the CJEU has focused in particular on the objecti-
ves of the monetary policy measure. The PEPP’s stated objective is “to counter the seri-
ous risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the outlook for the euro 
area posed by the outbreak and escalating diffusion of the coronavirus, COVID-19.”6 The 
PEPP’s objectives resemble those of the OMT, which was “geared to repairing monetary 
policy transmission channels in a way that [the ECB’s] standard monetary policy can ad-
dress its primary objective, i.e. maintaining price stability.”7
Thus, the CJEU’s assessment of why OMT was within the ECB’s mandate is a good yard-
stick. In its Gauweiler judgement, the CJEU confirmed that a programme to safeguard 
the appropriate transmission of monetary policy is likely to contribute to the ECB’s price 
stability objective.8 The Court further stated that if the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism is disrupted, ECB decisions are likely to become ineffective, thereby under-
mining the singleness of monetary policy and the ESCB’s ability to guarantee price sta-
bility across the Union.9 Thus, measures to preserve the transmission mechanism are as 
such within the ECB’s mandate. 
Thus, if the ECB considers that the COVID-19 pandemic poses a risk to the smooth trans-
mission of monetary policy, it may swiftly intervene in bond markets to fulfil its price sta-
bility mandate. Hence, the PEPP fulfils the first criterion: It is within the ECB’s mandate.
 b. The PEPP is a proportional measure
According to pertinent CJEU case law, ECB bond-buying programmes are allowed only 
if they comply with the proportionality requirement under EU law. This stipulates that 
a monetary policy measure by the ECB is (i) suitable to fulfil the price stability objective 
and (ii) necessary to achieve that objective.10 
Suitability
When assessing the suitability of a bond purchase programme, the CJEU gives the ECB 
broad discretion:11 The Court essentially relies on the ECB’s own analysis of the relevant 
economic and financial parameters.12 As long as the measures adopted by the ECB are 
not “vitiated by a manifest error of assessment”, i.e. are not obviously misguided from 
5 Article 3(1)(c) in conjunction with Article 282(1) TFEU.
6 ECB, supra note 1.
7 ECB, Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A), Frankfurt am Main (6 September 2012), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2019/html/ecb.is190912~658eb51d68.en.html.
8 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. ECB, at 49-50.
9 Ibid, at 50. 
10 Under EU law, the necessity analysis also includes an assessment as to whether a given measure is the 
“least cumbersome means” to achieve the stated objective. I will address this third prong as part of the 
review of the PEPP’s necessity.
11 Case C-493/17, Weiss v. ECB, at 73.
12 Ibid, at 78.
4/9
an economic standpoint, they are suitable to achieve the price stability objective. In the 
context of the PSPP, for instance, the CJEU accepted the risk of a decline in prices over the 
medium term as a valid justification.13 Even more relevant for the PEPP, in Gauweiler, the 
CJEU followed the ECB’s reasoning that the high volatility and extreme spreads between 
euro area countries can give rise to a fragmentation as regards bank refinancing condi-
tions and credit costs, thereby greatly limiting the effects of the ECB’s monetary policy 
impulses.14  
The PEPP primarily seeks to address the same pressing risk as the OMT programme that 
was launched at the peak of the euro area crisis, namely risk to the smooth transmis-
sion of monetary policy across the Union. The COVID-19 pandemic, and the response 
by public health authorities to it, has led to an extreme and unprecedented economic 
shock affecting both the real economy and the financial sector.15 In the days before the 
announcement, the spread between Italian and German 10-year sovereign bonds es-
sentially doubled in less than a week. There was a clear and palatable risk to monetary 
policy transmission that the PEPP sought to address. And as these risks identified by the 
ECB were, at the very minimum, comparable to those that justified the OMT programme 
and the PSPP, it is clear that the PEPP can be considered a suitable measure to maintain 
price stability.
Necessity
But a bond-buying programme does not only have to be suitable – it must also be neces-
sary to fulfil the ECB’s mandate: ECB measures must not “go manifestly beyond what is 
necessary to achieve [the price stability] objective.”16 To judge whether a measure goes 
beyond what is necessary, a useful benchmark from previous judgments is what limits 
and safeguards the programme contains to ensure proportionality. According to the CJEU, 
(self-imposed) safeguards “help guarantee that its effects are limited to what is necessa-
ry to achieve the objective concerned.”17 When assessing the PSPP, the CJEU considered 
the following safeguards sufficient: The ECB’s purchases were (i) not selective, (ii) bonds 
were subject to stringent eligibility criteria, (iii) purchases were temporary in nature, (iv) 
they were limited in size and risk, and (v) subject to purchase limits per issue and issuer.18
The PEPP has very similar features: First, it appears that PEPP purchases will, similarly, 
not be selective – the ECB will purchase bonds issued by all euro area countries.19 While 
this means that an OMT-like targeting of only one Member States’ bonds is not possible 
over the full duration of the programme, the PEPP would also not require a country to 
enter into an ESM (European Stability Mechanism) programme to be eligible. Second, 
13 Case C-493/17, Weiss v. ECB, at 74-78.
14 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. ECB, at 72. According to the Court, this is because the (different) interest 
rates for government bonds across the currency union play a decisive role in the setting of the interest 
rate applicable to various economic actors. Also see for some bibliography, Chiara Zilioli, Proportionality as 
the organising principle of European banking regulation in Theodor Baums, Hermann Remsperger, Michael 
Sachs, Volker Wieland (eds.), Zentralbanken, Währungsunion und stabiles Finanzsystem (Duncker & Humblot, 
2019).
15 According to some forecasts, the world economy went into recession just three weeks after the virus 
broke out in Europe; see Rahul Karunakar and Shrutee Sarkar, Global economy already in recession on 
coronavirus devastation: Reuters poll, Reuters (19 March 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-global-economy/global-economy-already-in-recession-on-coronavirus-devastation-reuters-
poll-idUSKBN21702Y.
16 Case C-493/17, Weiss v. ECB, at 79.
17 Ibid, at 82.
18 Ibid, at 79-100.
19 ECB, supra note 1.
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the PEPP will essentially be limited to bonds eligible under the ECB‘s existing asset pur-
chase programmes and therefore not pose additional risks to its balance sheet.20 Third, 
the PEPP’s duration is linked to the malfunctioning of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and hence is temporary in nature. It does 
not go beyond what is required. Fourth, the overall volume of PEPP purchases is ex-ante 
limited to EUR750 billion euros.21  
However, two aspects of PEPP purchases have not yet been clarified in the press release.22 
 
First, whether the ECB intends to emulate the loss-sharing arrangement governing PSPP 
purchases. The PSPP’s loss allocation, which shifted much of the credit risk from bond 
purchases away from the ECB to the NCBs, was considered an important feature to sup-
port the programme’s necessity by the Court.23 A similar operational feature would mit-
igate immediate credit risks to the ECB’s balance sheet, thereby further insulating the 
PEPP from challenges on necessity grounds.
The second open question is whether the Eurosystem will buy bonds beyond the self-im-
posed issuer and issue limits that apply to PEPP purchases. The Governing Council hinted 
already in the PEPP press release that it might need to go further.24 Since this question is 
also connected to the PEPP’s compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing, and 
since it warrants a more nuanced technical analysis, it will be further discussed below.25 
This leads to the preliminary conclusion that, as the PEPP is likely to rely on similar sa-
feguards as the PSPP, it can be considered to abide by what is necessary to achieve the 
ECB’s price stability objective, thus respecting the principle of proportionality.
 c. The PEPP complies with the monetary financing prohibition
The third major legal issue when it comes to PEPP compliance with EU law – or that of 
any ECB bond purchase programme for that matter – relates to the prohibition of mone-
tary financing under Article 123(1) TFEU.26 There are overlaps between the assessment of 
compliance with Article 123(1) TFEU and the proportionality analysis. Therefore, the text 
will focus in this part on the aspects and implications pertaining only to the monetary 
financing prohibition.
The prohibition of monetary financing essentially seeks to discourage unsound fiscal po-
licy on the back of ECB money. In the context of Article 123(1) TFEU, the CJEU’s applies a 
two-pronged analysis. First, the ECB may not purchase bonds on the secondary market 
20 Ibid. One difference, according to the ECB’s press release, is that Greek sovereign bonds will be included 
in the universe of eligible bonds.
21 Ibid.
22 Van der Sluis reaches the same conclusion, see Marijn van der Sluis, Analysis: “Fighting the fallout: the 
ECB adopts a purchase programme in response to the coronavirus”, EULawLive Blog (24 March 2020), https://
eulawlive.com/analysis-fighting-the-fallout-the-ecb-adopts-a-purchase-programme-in-response-to-the-
coronavirus-by-marijn-van-der-sluis/.
23 Case C-493/17, Weiss v. ECB, at 99.
24 ECB, supra note 1.
25 See infra “Would an increase in the issuer and issue limits be legal?”
26 Article 123(1) states the following: “Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the 
European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as „national 
central banks“) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, 
local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member 
States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or natio-
nal central banks of debt instruments.”
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that would have an equivalent effect to that of a direct purchase of bonds by Member 
States. Second, the ECB must build in sufficient safeguards to keep incentives to follow a 
sound budgetary policy in place.27
The PEPP is not equivalent to bond purchases on primary markets 
Secondary market purchases are allowed by the Treaties, as long as they are not equiva-
lent to a measure granting financial assistance to a Member State.28 The PEPP, like the 
PSPP, would not amount to such direct assistance to Member States because it enshrines 
both programme’s safeguards, including a blackout period, the possibility of ad hoc de-
viations in the allocation of securities bought under the PEPP, the purchase of securities 
across the entire yield curve, and the restrictions on the publication of granular informa-
tion on Eurosystem bond holdings. The ECB has already announced that “PEPP purchases 
will be conducted in a flexible manner, which allows for fluctuations in the distribution 
of purchase flows over time, across asset classes and among jurisdictions.”29  
The PEPP does not undermine incentives for sound budgetary policies
Article 123(1) prohibits the ECB from providing any impetus to Member States to pursue 
unsound fiscal policies. However, there seems to be widespread agreement among ex-
perts across the political spectrum that the appropriate response to the current econo-
mic shock is an expansionary fiscal policy.30 The European Commission as the guardian of 
the EU’s fiscal rules has proposed the activation of the general escape clause under the 
Stability and Growth Pact, a measure approved by the ECOFIN Council on 23 March. The 
signal could not be clearer that budgetary policy has shifted into crisis mode, and with 
it the definition of what a “sound” fiscal policy is. Indeed, it would arguably be irrespon-
sible for any euro area government to stick rigidly to its fiscal policies in the face of an 
economic shock of the scale triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
This has important implications for the PEPP‘s legality. If the only “sound” policy is to de-
ploy huge fiscal programmes, the argument that the PEPP could weaken Member States’ 
resolve to follow sound budgetary policies fails to convince. European Governments and 
their Parliaments have already (re)set the fiscal parameters before the Eurosystem has 
acquired a single bond under the PEPP and the Commission as the chief authority over 
EU economic governance rules has given its green light. And even if one were to (falsely) 
claim that a “sound” budgetary policy is necessarily contractionary, there is still little or 
no evidence that the ECB has given such a steer. Indeed, many national authorities adop-
ted more expansionary fiscal policies before the ECB’s Governing Council announced the 
PEPP.31 Challenging the legality of the PEPP on the basis of Article 123(1) TFEU will thus 
prove even more difficult than with regard to the OMT and the PSPP.
27 Case C-493/17, Weiss v. ECB, at 106-107.
28 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. ECB, at 103.
29 Christine Lagarde, Our response to the coronavirus emergency, The ECB Blog by Christine Lagarde, Pre-
sident of the ECB (19 March 2020), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2020/html/ecb.blog-
200319~11f421e25e.en.html.
30 E.g. Martin Sandbu, Huge fiscal spending is needed to fight the coronavirus downturn, Financial Times (17 
March 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/9963f71e-67b2-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3; Maria Demertzis, 
André Sapir, Simone Tagliapietra and Guntram B. Wolff, An effective economic response to the coronavirus 
in Europe, Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue no 6, March 2020, https://www.bruegel.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2020/03/PC-06-2020-130320.pdf.
31 See Sonia Sirletti , John Follain, and Flavia Rotondi, Italy Announces $28 Billion Plan to Cushion Virus-Hit 
Economy, Bloomberg (10 March 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-10/conte-
calls-on-ecb-to-do-whatever-it-takes-against-coronavirus.
7/9
Therefore, we can conclude that the PEPP also meets the third criterion of the CJEU as it 
complies with the monetary financing prohibition.
Would an increase in issuer and issue limits be legal? 
The announcement of the PEPP also contained an important sentence about a possible 
further change to its setup: “To the extent that some self-imposed limits might hamper 
action that the ECB is required to take in order to fulfil its mandate, the Governing Coun-
cil will consider revising them to the extent necessary to make its action proportionate 
to the risks that we face.” The ECB is signalling here that it might relax some of the sa-
feguards discussed above to ensure the programme remains an effective tool. This con-
cerns in particular the issuer and issue limits: these both stand at 33%, but might need to 
be raised at some point to make sure the ECB and the NCBs can still buy bonds according 
to the capital key once it hits these limits for a number of member states, in particular 
Germany. The question then is: Would the legal assessment above hold true even with 
higher issuer and issue limits? The answer is yes, and here is why:
Under the PSPP, the ECB may not purchase more than 33% of a single PSPP-eligible se-
curity (issue share limit) and not more than 33% of a Member States’ total outstanding 
securities (issuer limit).32 When the PSPP was launched, the justification for the two self-
imposed limits was (i) to ensure that the Eurosystem did not reach a blocking minority 
for the purposes of collective action clauses (CACs) and (ii) to safeguard market functio-
ning and price formation.33 But does this also hold for the PEPP?
First, it is important to remember that the PSPP was the first programme with pre-de-
fined issuer and issue limits – the SMP and the OMT programmes, both of which passed 
the CJEU’s assessment, had no such features. To be sure, sovereign bonds had no CACs 
when the SMP and the OMT programmes were launched. But the CJEU could have still 
demanded ECB measures to “safeguard market functioning and price formation” – it 
did not. Second, even in the context of the PSPP, the Court did not prescribe that the 
purchase limits need to be of a specific amount. Rather, it emphasised that, since the 
Eurosystem “is not permitted to buy either all the bonds issued by such an issuer or the 
entirety of a given issue of those bonds, […] a private operator necessarily runs the risk 
of not being able to resell them to the ESCB on the secondary markets […].34 The PEPP 
would follow the same logic. While the 33% limits from the PSPP might not be suitable 
for the PEPP’s objectives, the Eurosystem would never purchase an entire series of bonds, 
yet alone all bonds issued by a Member State. And since the Court does not focus on the 
exact amount of the limits but on private investors’ inability to resell their securities 
with certainty to the Eurosystem, a proportionate deviation from the PSPP limits is, the-
refore, unlikely to render the PEPP unlawful.
Moreover, aside from the fact that the PEPP is a different programme with different ob-
jectives, keeping the PSPP’s purchase limits might also be unnecessary for two other rea-
sons: 
32 See ECB, Public sector purchase programme (PSPP) - Questions & Answers, 2 December 2019, https://www.
ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp-qa.en.html.
33 For an analysis, see Sebastian Grund and Filip Grle, The European Central Bank‘s Public Sector Purchase 
Programme (PSPP), the Prohibition of Monetary Financing and Sovereign Debt Restructuring Scenarios, 41(6) 
European Law Review 795 (2016).
34 Case C-493/17, Weiss v. ECB, at 125.
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First, the main reason why some argue that issuer limits are necessary is because the 
Eurosystem will always have to vote against any debt restructuring to avoid a breach of 
the monetary financing prohibition. Therefore, the argument goes, it should not have a 
blocking minority in any bond issue. However, this is short-sighted: it is far from clear 
that the Eurosystem would always be better off in terms of actual losses and hence of 
the amount of monetary financing in a restructuring case if it always were to block an 
orderly sovereign debt restructuring. Let‘s imagine, as has been the practice in previous 
debt workouts, that a country decides to only repay those creditors that participate in 
debt negotiations and agree to a haircut.35 Indeed, if Eurosystem central banks would, 
as most creditors do, accept a restructuring, they might incur significantly fewer los-
ses than with an uncompromising holdout strategy.36 It would be hard to qualify this as 
“monetary financing.”
Second, the risk of distortions in price formation channels from central bank bond pur-
chase programmes may be overstated. For instance, as regards the Corporate Sector Pur-
chase Programme (CSPP), the ECB may buy up to 70% per bond issue. Pertinent economic 
research did not find any price dislocations for bonds eligible under the CSPP.37 Similarly, 
sovereign bond purchases, if sufficiently split along the yield curve, may not result in any 
local deformations.38 Indeed, appropriate operational parameters and a certain degree 
of flexibility can have significant positive effects on the price discovery mechanism, even 
with regard to large-scale asset purchase programmes.39 
In sum, these arguments should lead us to the conclusion that even an increase in the 
issuer and/or issue limits would not undermine the PEPP’s compliance with EU law.
Conclusions and implications for the PEPP‘S Design 
The announcement of the PEPP marks an unprecedented step in the history of European 
monetary integration. But it is an appropriate response to the global public health emer-
gency that the COVID-19 outbreak poses as well as the financial and economic shock 
that it has triggered. The legality of the PEPP can be defended in the light of both these 
extraordinary macroeconomic circumstances as well as the CJEU’s assessment of previ-
ous ECB bond purchase programmes. As this policy brief shows, the Court’s Gauweiler 
40and Weiss41 decisions have defined the boundaries within which the ECB may design its 
monetary policy measures. And the PEPP does not transgress these boundaries. 
However, in order to mitigate the risk of any ex-post legal challenges, the legal act on 
which the PEPP is based should underscore the following principles, which are informed 
35 See for an overview of the sovereign debt restructuring process Lee Buchheit, Guillaume Chabert, Chan-
da DeLong and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, How to Restructure Sovereign Debt: Lessons from Four Decades, Peter-
son Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 19-8, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3387455.
36 For a discussion of the ECB’s involvement in sovereign debt restructurings, see Grund and Grle, supra 
note 33.
37 Benjamin Grosse-Rueschkamp, Sascha Steffen, and Daniel Streitz, A capital structure channel of moneta-
ry policy, 133 Journal of Financial Economics 357 (2019).
38 William Arrata and Benoît Nguyen, Price impact of bond supply shocks: Evidence from the Eurosystem’s 
asset purchase program, Banque de France Working Paper 623 (March 2017).
39 Felix Hammermann, Kieran Leonard, Stefano Nardelli and Julian von Landesberger, Taking stock of the 
Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme after the end of net asset purchases, Economic Bulletin Issue 2, 2019,  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/articles/2020/html/ecb.ebart202002_03~13fd3ff790.
en.html. 
40 Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. ECB.
41 Case C-493/17, Weiss v. ECB.
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by pertinent CJEU jurisprudence:
1. The PEPP’s objectives are proportional because they address a malfunctioning of the 
 smooth transmission of monetary policy signals across the currency area triggered 
 by the sudden stop in economic activity, thereby undermining the singleness of mo-
 netary policy.
2. The PEPP’s design is proportional because it entails the following safeguards: bond 
 purchases are (i) restricted to EUR750 billion, (ii) limited in time to periods of mal-
 functioning monetary policy transmission channels, (iii) not selective, (iv) limited to 
 securities with stringent eligibility criteria, and (v) subject to a limited loss-sharing 
 arrangement.
3. The PEPP does not breach the monetary financing prohibition because it (i) has no 
 equivalent effect to bond purchases on primary markets (due to the safeguards men-
 tioned in 2.) and (ii) does not incentivize Member States to pursue „unsound“ budge-
 tary policies.
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